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IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION-
AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR
EXCEPTION
Brenda Barbara Weitzman, born in South Africa, married Ronald Weitz-
man, a United States citizen, in Tel Aviv, Israel. Upon entering this coun-
try she affirmed that she was attached to the principles of the Constitution
of the United States and in 1966 filed a petition for naturalization. Dur-
ing the preliminary examination before the naturalization examiner and
during the de novo hearing before the district judge, Mrs. Weitzman re-
fused to take that portion of the oath which would require her to bear arms
on behalf of the United States or to perform noncombatant service in the
Armed Forces of the United States. She gave as the reason her pacifist be-
liefs, which had a non-religious basis as that term traditionally has been in-
terpreted. She described her pacifism as biological and instinctive, testi-
fying that she did not believe in a supernatural power, Supreme Being or
other Superior Relationship. In the district court' Mrs. Weitzman con-
tended in the alternative that her pacifism conformed to the requirements
of "religious training and belief" as that phrase had been interpreted in
United States v. Seeger;2 she also contended that section 337(a) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act of June 27, 19523 was unconstitutional.
1. In re Weitzman, 284 F. Supp. 514 (D. Minn. 1968).
2. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
3. 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a) (1964) provides that "(a) A person who has peti-
tioned for naturalization shall, in order to be and before being admitted to
citizenship, take in open court an oath (1) to support the Constitution of the
United States; (2) to renounce and abjure absolutely and entirely all allegiance and
fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty of whom or which
the petitioner was before a subject or citizen; (3) to support and defend the Con-
stitution and the laws of the United States against all enemies, foreign and do-
mestic; (4) to bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and (5)(A) to bear arms
on behalf of the United States when required by the law, or (B) to perform non-
combatant service in the Armed Forces of the United States when required by the
law, or (C) to perform of national work importance under civilian direction when
required by the law. Any such person shall be required to take an oath containing
the substance of clauses (1)-(5) of the preceding sentence, except that a person who
shows by clear and convincing evidence to the satisfaction of the naturalization
court that he is opposed to the bearing of arms in the Armed Forces of the United
States by reason of religious training and belief shall be required to take an oath
containing the substance of clauses (1)-(4) and clauses (5)-(B) and (5)-(C) of
this subsection, and a person who shows by clear and convincing evidence to the
satisfaction of the naturalization court that he is opposed to any type of service in
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She confined her petition for review, however, solely to the constitutional
question. In a per curiam opinion the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that an applicant for citizenship whose objection to military service
is based on his "biological" and "instinctual" aversion to killing and a be-
lief in the "order of existence," rather than religious teachings or belief in a
Supreme Being, is entitled to naturalization upon taking the oath to per-
form work of national importance under civilian direction when required
by law. In re Weitzman, 426 F.2d 439 (8th Cir. 1970).
Section 337(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of June 27,
1952,4 requires an applicant for citizenship to take an oath to bear arms on
behalf of the United States unless, by reason of "religious training and be-
lief," he is conscientiously opposed to the bearing of arms or to any type of
noncombatant service in the Armed Forces. "Religious training and be-
lief" is defined as:
[A]n individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior
to those arising from any human relation, but does not include essentially political,
sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code .... 5
It is the intent of this note to present a review of the statutory and judi-
cial treatment of the naturalization of aliens, especially with regard to the
provisions for exemption as a conscientious objector. Attention will also
be given to the parallel development under similar language in the selective
service context with special emphasis on developments since the 1965 de-
cision of United States v. Seeger.6 Finally, an evaluation of the signifi-
cance of Weitzman will be made including recommendations for the future.
The power to enact naturalization legislation rests with Congress, as pro-
vided by the Constitution in Article I, Section 8: "Congress shall have
power . . . to establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization . . . ." Several
fundamental principles have further been established by judicial decisions.
The 1817 case of Chirac v. Chirac7 held that Congress was to have exclu-
sive power over naturalization. This principle was qualified by Mr. Justice
Marshall, in Osborn v. The President, Directors, and Co. of the Bank of the
the Armed Services of the United States by reason of religious training and belief
shall be required to take an oath containing the substance of said clauses (1)-(4)
and clause (5)-(C). The term 'religious training and belief' as used in this sec-
tion shall mean an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving
duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but does not include
essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral
code."
4. 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a) (1964).
5. 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a) (1964).
6. Supra note 2.
7. 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259, 269 (1817).
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United States8 with the proviso that the rules established be applied uni-
formly.9 Citizenship through naturalization, as noted by Mr. Justice Mc-
Reynolds in United States v. Manzi,10 is a privilege, granted only upon a
showing that the statutory requirements have been strictly met. 1 In addi-
tion, the applicant is viewed as the moving party in such a proceeding; thus,
it is recognized that doubts should be resolved in favor of the United States
and against the claimant. 12 Therefore, the burden is on the alien applicant
to show his eligibility for citizenship." Finally, under whatever theory he
advances, the applicant, if claiming conscientious objection, must show,
by clear and convincing evidence, that he comes within the statutory exemp-
tion.14
8. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 837 (1824).
9. Id. at 827-28, where J. Marshall wrote: "A naturalized citizen is, indeed
made a citizen under an act of Congress but the act does not proceed to give, to
regulate, or to prescribe his capacities. He becomes a member of the society, pos-
sessing all the rights of a native citizen, and standing, in the view of the constitu-
tion, on the footing of a native. The constitution does not authorize Congress to
enlarge or abridge those rights. The simple power of the national legislature is to
prescribe a uniform rule of naturalization, and the exercise of this power exhausts
it so far as respects the individual. The constitution then takes him up, and
among other rights, extends to him the capacity of suing in the courts of the
United States, precisely under the same circumstances under which a native might
sue. He is distinguishable in nothing from a native citizen, except as far as the
constitution makes the distinction; the law makes none."
10. 276 U.S. 463 (1928).
11. See also, Maney v. United States, 278 U.S. 17 (1928); Tutun v. United
States, 270 U.S. 568 (1926); United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U.S. 472 (1917);
United States v. Ness, 245 U.S. 319 (1917); Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9
(1913); Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227 (1912); Zartarian v. Billings,
204 U.S. 170 (1907); and Swan and Finch Co. v. United States, 190 U.S. 143
(1903).
12. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 316(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1427(a);
see also Berenyi v. District Director, 385 U.S. 630 (1967); United States v.
Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931); Taylor v. United States, 231 F.2d 856 (5th Cir.
1956); Burkiewicz v. Savoretti, 211 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1954); Petition of Giz, 264
F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Cal. 1965); and Petition of Suey Chin, 173 F. Supp. 510
(S.D.N.Y. 1959).
13. Immigration and Nationality Act § 316 (a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1427 (a); see
also Macintosh, supra note 12 at 626, Preisler v. United States, 238 F.2d 238 (2nd
Cir. 1956) cert. denied 352 U.S. 990 (1957); Johnson v. United States, 186 F.2d
588 (2nd Cir. 1951); In re Matz, 296 F. Supp. 927 (E.D. Cal. 1969); In re Russo,
259 F. Supp. 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); and Sodo v. United States, 406 Il1. 484, 96
N.E.2d 325 (1959).
14. See Rase v. United States, 129 F.2d 204 (6th Cir. 1942); United States
v. Hein, 112 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Ill. 1953); Berenyi v. District Director, supra
note 12, where Justice Stewert observed: "When the government seeks to strip a
person of citizenship already acquired, or deport a resident alien and send him from
our shores, it carries the heavy burden of proving its case by 'clear and un-
equivocal and convincing evidence,' Woodley v. Immigration and Naturalization
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Initial legislation required both that the applicant affirm by oath his sup-
port of the Constitution 5 and that the naturalization court find that the
alien was "attached to the principles of the Constitution."' 6 The subse-
quent Act of 1906 expanded the oath to include the words "support and
defend the Constitution and Laws of the United States against all enemies,
foreign and domestic, and bear true faith and allegiance to the same."' 1 7
Thus, the earliest legislation required a finding that the applicant was at-
tached to the principles of the Constitution and a person of "good moral
character. s18 With the 1906 legislation, the requirement that the appli-
cant affirm his willingness to bear arms began to emerge, although it was
not yet an express part of the statutory oath. By 1923, however, the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service felt that a requirement to bear arms
was inherent in the existing oath to support and defend the Constitution;
therefore, a question to this effect was included in the application and
treated as a prerequisite to the granting of citizenship. 19
Service, 385 U.S. 286, 17 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1966). But when an alien seeks to obtain
the privilege and benefits of citizenship the shoe is on the other foot. He is the
moving party affirmatively asking the Government to endow him with all the ad-
vantages of citizenship. Because that status once granted, cannot lightly be taken
away, the Government has strong and legitimate interest in insuring that only qual-
ified persons are granted citizenship. For these reasons it has been universally
accepted that the burden is on the alien applicant to show his eligibility for citizen-
ship in every respect. This court has often stated that doubts 'should be resolved
in favor of the United States and against the claimant.'" Berenyi v. District
Director, supra note 12 at 636-37.
15. Act of March 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, which provided: "That any
alien, being a free white person, who shall have resided within the limits and under
the jurisdiction of the United States for the term of two years, may be admitted to
become a citizen on application to any common law court of record, in any one
of the states wherein he shall have resided for the term of one year at least, and
making proof to the satisfaction of such court, that he is a person of good character,
and taking the oath or affirmation prescribed by law, to support the constitution of
the United States, which oath or affirmation such court shall administer; . .."
16. Act of June 29, 1795, 1 Stat. 414 which provided: "He Shall (the applicant)
at the time of his application to be admitted declare an oath or affirmation, . . . that
he will support the Constitution of the United States; .. .Thirdly . . . and he shall
further appear to their satisfaction, that during that time (of residence in the
United States), he has behaved as a man of good moral character, attached to the
principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good
order and happiness of the same.
17. Immigration and Naturalization Act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 596.
18. Immigration and Naturalization Act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 596. See
also In re Halas, 274 F. Supp. 604 (E.D. Pa. 1967); United States v. Sherman,
40 F. Supp. 478 (E.D. N.Y. 1941); In re McNeil, 14 F. Supp. 394 (N.D. Cal. 1936);
United States v. Wexler, 8 F. Supp. 880 (E.D.N.Y. 1925); In re Sigleman, 268 F.
Supp. 217 (E.D. Mo. 1920); United States v. Leles, 236 F. 784 (N.D. Cal. 1916).
19. See the court's discussion to this effect in In re Weitzman, 426 F.2d 439,
446 (8th Cir. 1970).
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Such an interpretation by the Service was, upon challenge by the in-
dividual claiming to be a conscientious objector, upheld by the Supreme
Court in three significant decisions. The first of these, United States v.
Schwimmer,20 involved a fourty-eight year old woman who refused to take
the oath to bear arms, claiming to be an uncompromising pacifist, with no
sense of nationalism, but only a cosmic sense of belonging to the human
family. Pointing out that the defense of the Constitution and laws of the
nation was a necessary feature of organized government, Mr. Justice
Butler, concluded that the act of this conscientious objector "evidence[d] a
want of that attachment to the principles of the constitution of which the
applicant is required to give affirmative evidence by the Naturalization
Act."' 2 1 Thus, a willingness to bear arms was established as an essential
qualification for citizenship. Similar reasoning was also found in United
States v. Macintosh,2 2 in which a divinity student was unwilling to swear to
bear arms unless he believed the war to be morally justified. Mr. Justice
Sutherland, again emphasizing that the Constitution provided for the com-
mon defense and war power of Congress and that the privilege of conscien-
tious objection comes not from the Constitution but from acts of Congress,
concluded that admission to citizenship was properly denied to such an
applicant. The third decision, decided on the same day as Macintosh, was
United States v. Bland,23 in which the Court, by identical reasoning as in
the two previous decisions, held that naturalization was properly denied
where the applicant refused to take the oath to defend the Constitution and
laws against all enemies without the written insertion of the words "as
far as my conscience as a Christian will allow."'24
These three decisions were ultimately overruled by Girouard v. United
States25 in which the Supreme Court held that the promise to bear arms
could not be implied from existing statutory language; therefore, an ob-
jection to bearing arms was not proper grounds on which to deny a petition
for citizenship. In considering the petition for citizenship of a Seventh-day
Adventist, who was willing to perform noncombatant service but would not
affirm a willingness to bear arms, Mr. Justice Douglas reasoned that the
bearing of arms is not the only way in which the nations' institutions may
20. 279 U.S. 644 (1929), with Holmes, Brandeis and Sanford dissenting.
21. Id. at 652-53.
22. 283 U.S. 605 (1931), with Hughes, Holmes, Brandeis and Stone dis-
senting.
23. 283 U.S. 636 (1931), with Hughes, Holmes, Brandeis and Stone dissenting.
24. Id.
25. 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
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be supported and defended. Also he reasoned that similar religious beliefs
would not disqualify the petitioner from .holding public offices which re-
quire identical oaths. Therefore, without unequivocal language to the con-
trary, it could not be assumed that Congress intended to make a promise to
bear arms a prerequisite to naturalization. Thus, a willingness to bear arms
was eliminated by Girouard as a prerequisite to the granting of citizenship.
Subsequently, by an act of September 23, 1950,26 Congress amended
the oath to require that the applicant promise to bear arms on behalf of the
United States or perform noncombatant service in the Armed Forces. An
alternative oath was also provided for the applicant who demonstrated that
he was opposed to performing noncombatant service by reason of "religious
training and belief."'27 "Religious training and belief," which was enun-
ciated in the 1952 act, 28 is defined as: "[A]n individual's belief in a Su-
preme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human re-
lation, but . . . not . . . political, sociological, or philosphical views or a
merely personal moral code."'29 The requirement of a promise to bear arms
was, therefore, reinstated as a prerequisite to citizenship; however, special
provision was made for those who express a conscientious objection to
bearing arms.
Since this initial 1950 provision, the language regarding conscientious ob-
jection in the naturalization act has remained nearly constant. Because
virtually all cases interpreting the requirement of "religious training and
belief" have arisen under the selective service statutes, naturalization ap-
plications have traditionally been considered in the light of the standards
established thereunder. Therefore, a review of the statutory and judicial
treatment of conscientious objection in the selective service context is ap-
propriate for an insight into how naturalization claims are treated.
Initial provisions under the draft laws for conscientious objection were
found in the Selective Draft Act of 1917,30 which provided exemption only
26. Act of Sept. 23, 1950, ch. 1024, § 2, 64 Stat. 987.
27. 8 U.S.C. § 1448 (a) (1964).
28. 8 U.S.C. § 1448 (a) (1964).
29. 8 U.S.C. § 1448 (a) (1964). The definition was then identical to that
provided in the Universal Military Training and Service Act, 62 Stat. 613 (1948) as
amended 50 U.S.C. App. § 456 (j) (1968). By the Selective Service Act of 1967
Pub. L. 90-40, 81 Stat. 104, the term "Supreme Being" was deleted from the statute's
definition of religion. Thus in the Selective Service context, the definition presently
states that, "[t]he term 'religious training and belief does not include essentially
political, sociological or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code." 50
U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1968). The reference to a Supreme Being remains, how-
ever, in the naturalization statute.
30. Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, § 4, 40 Stat. 78.
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for members of a "well-organized religious sect or organization . . . whose
existing creed or principles forbid its members to participate in war ..
."31 Exemption based upon "religious training and belief' was first
granted under the Selective Service and Training Act of 1940.32 Early
decisions under this act approved exemption where the registrants' beliefs
were based solely on broad philosophical or humanitarian principles, inter-
preting such views as essentially religious in nature.33 However, the Selec-
tive Service Act of 194834 rejected this approach, following the reasoning of
Berman v. United States, 35 which held that a religious belief must be based
upon a belief in a Supreme Being, resulting in the definition of "religious
training and belief."
This restrictive interpretation of the Selective Service Act of 191736
was initially applied in the naturalization context; however that interpreta-
tion was later relaxed by the decisions of In re Nissen37 and In re Hansen,38
both of which were interpreted in the light of the 1952 definition of "reli-
gious training and belief." The Nissen decision involved a fourty-eight
year old applicant for naturalization who, as a member of the Lutheran
faith, asserted as a personal belief that it was wrong to bear arms. In
granting a motion for reconsideration, the court held that Congress viewed
training as "meaning no more than individual experience supporting be-
lief, a mere background against which sincerity could be tested."3 9 There-
fore, the fact that the applicant was not a member of a pacifist sect should
not serve as a barrier to his naturalization. Similarly, the Hansen decision
involved a fifty-nine year old applicant for naturalization whose religious
code was also found to stem from a sincere personal belief in a Supreme
Being, rather than from formal religious training. In granting the conscien-
tious objector exemption, this court held that "religious training and belief'
was a single concept. A personal religious code based on a relation to a
Supreme Being, thus, was sufficient, notwithstanding the fact that it was not
31. Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, § 4, 40 Stat. 78.
32. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 5 (9), 54 Stat. 889.
33. See, e.g., United States ex rel Reel v. Badt, 141 F.2d 845 (2nd Cir. 1944),
af 'd on rehearing, 152 F.2d 627 (2nd Cir. 1945), petition for cert. dismissed,
328 U.S. 817 (1946); United States ex rel Phillips v. Downer, 135 F.2d 521 (2nd
Cir. 1943); and United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (2nd Cir. 1943) (dictum).
34. 62 Stat. 612 (1948), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 456 (j) (1968).
35. 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1946), cert. denied 329 U.S. 795 (1946).
36. Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, § 4, 40 Stat. 78.
37. 137 F. Supp. 483 (D. Mass. 1955), reconsideration granted 146 F. Supp.
361 (D. Mass. 1956).
38. 148 F. Supp. 187 (D. Minn. 1957).
39. Supra note 37, 146 F. Supp. at 363.
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derived from the formal tenents of a church. While religious training may
serve as evidence supporting the sincerity of the professed belief, the court
ruled that it may not be viewed as a prerequisite to such belief. The Han-
sen decision, therefore, reduced to a minimum the significance of the
word "training" as used in the statute. Both decisions indicate that the
fact that an applicant's belief was based on a personal religious code,
rather than the tenets of a church to which he belonged, no longer served
to disqualify him for the exemption.
It is apparent from the above that the bases recognized for conscientious
objection have undergone continual expansion from the initially restrictive
1917 provision. 40  This trend culminated in the decision of United States v.
Seeger41 in which the Supreme Court, in the selective service context, for-
mulated a new definition of religion, the object of which was to decide
whether the beliefs professed by the registrant were sincerely held and
whether they were, by his own philosophy, religious in nature. As stated
by the court:
[Tihe test of belief in a relation to a Supreme Being is whether a given belief
that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of the possessor parallel
to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the
exemption. 4 2
The Seeger decision significantly broadened the scope of the conscientious
objector exemption with the result that the exemption now extended be-
yond traditional religious beliefs. Whereas previously belief in an ortho-
dox God or Supreme Being was required, that term was broadened with
this interpretation to encompass a power or being, or a faith "to which all
else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent. '' 4 1 The
conscientious objector no longer had to derive his opposition to war from
belief in a Supreme Being. If the beliefs held appeared to occupy a place
in the life of the possessor sufficiently similar to the place occupied by the
beliefs of one who was clearly within the statutes' definition of religion, the
beliefs in question would qualify as "religious" within the terms of the stat-
ute. This test has come to be known as the "parallelism" (or "parallel be-
lief") test. The Court further emphasized the scope of the exemption in
stating:
40. Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, § 4, 40 Stat. 78.
41. Supra note 2, a consolidation of three cases in which local boards had denied
conscientious objector status because of the registrants' failure to base their objec-
tions to war on the belief in a Supreme Being. The two other decisions were
United States v. Jakobson, 325 F.2d 409 (2nd Cir. 1963) and Peter v. United
States, 324 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1963).
42. Supra note 2, at 165-66. As noted, supra note 29, the subsequently enacted
Selective Service Act of 1967 deleted the reference to a Supreme Being in its defini-
tion of religious training and belief.
43. Supra note 2, at 174.
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[T]he use by Congress of the words "merely personal" seems to us to restrict the
exemption to a moral code which is not only personal but which is the sole basis
for the registrants' belief and is in no way related to a Supreme Being.4 4
Under the new parallelism test then, a registrant would fail to qualify only
if his opposition to war was based solely on a personal moral code.
With the notion that applications for the conscientious objector exemp-
tion in naturalization cases are traditionally interpreted in the light of deci-
sions in the selective service context, several decisions in the latter area sub-
sequent to Seeger which have further expanded the parallelism test to in-
clude traditionally non-religious objectors should also be examined. Sig-
nificant among these is United States v. Shacter,45 in which an avowed
athiest was granted conscientious objector status under the Universal Mili-
tary Selective Service Act of 1967.46 Admitting that a belief which is
purely the product of reason and logic would not qualify, the court never-
theless interpreted the Seeger test to mean that if conscientious objection re-
sults from a religious belief or one based substantially on a faith holding
the same place in the believer's life as "a traditional belief in God holds in
the life of one clearly qualifying for exemption, then the exemption should
be granted."'47 The court concluded that atheistic beliefs could have been
reached by reason of "religious training and belief," as that term has been
construed by the Supreme Court in Seeger.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Levy 4 s granted
conscientious objector status to a registrant who ascribed as the basis for
his beliefs several non-religious literary works. Pointing out that while
some of the beliefs may not have wholly resulted from a belief in a Supreme
Being, the exemption should be granted where at least one belief was de-
rived from some Force or Supreme Being which prompted him to act ac-
cording to what he believed was right, such obligation being greater than
those owed to secular authorities. The court ruled that the registrant still
qualified, since his beliefs were also derived from previous religious train-
ing and did not stem purely from a personal code. 49
44. Supra note 2, at 186.
45. 293 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Md. 1968).
46. 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 456 (j) (1968).
47. Supra note 45, at 1060.
48. 419 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1969).
49. The 1970 decision of United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267 (1970), in-
volved a registrant conscientiously opposed to American military activities in Viet-
nam but who was not, in a formal sense, a religious conscientious objector. In the
district court 297 F. Supp. 902 (D. Mass. 1969), Chief Judge Wyzanski, finding
that Sisson's beliefs were the equivalent of a formal religion, held that § 6 (j) of
the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1967, violated the establishment
19711 1057CASE NOTES
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
The registrant in Welsh v. United States5" in applying for exemption as
a conscientious objector stated in his application that he would not affirm
or deny belief in a Supreme Being and struck the words "my religious train-
ing and" from the form. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had held that
the beliefs were not sufficiently religious to meet the terms of section 6(j)
and affirmed the conviction. 5 1 On appeal Mr. Justice Black, writing for
the Court, determined that Welsh qualified under the Seeger test; however,
consideration was not given to the constitutional questions which Welsh
had raised. Black, in considering the Seeger test, concluded that
if an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs that are purely ethical or
moral in source and content but that nevertheless impose upon him a duty of
conscience to refrain from participating in any war at any time, those beliefs cer-
tainly occupy in the life of that individual a place parallel to that filled by . . . God
in traditionally religious persons. Because his beliefs function as a religion in
his life, such an individual is as much entitled to a "religious" conscientious objec-
tion under § 6(j) as is someone who derives his conscientious opposition to war
from traditional religious convictions. 52
Thus, Welsh appears to have eliminated the requirements of "religious
belief," in that such belief may now have purely an ethical or moral
basis.53 It is noteworthy for our consideration of Weitzman that Black
went on to observe that in view of the broad scope of the word "religious"
a registrant's characterization of his beliefs as "non-religious" is not a re-
liable guide in administering the exemption. 54
of religion clause of the first amendment and that the same provision of the
Constitution along with the due process clause of the fifth amendment prohibited
Congress from subjecting Sisson to military orders that might have required him to
kill in Vietnam. The Supreme Court upon review held that it lacked jurisdiction
and did not give consideration to the merits of the case.
However, in the recent decision of Gillette v. United States, 39 U.S.L.W. 4305
(U.S. March 8, 1971), Mr. Justice Marshall held that one cannot claim conscien-
tious objection only to a particular war, rejecting the argument that § 6 (j) as
construed to cover only objectors to all wars is violative of the free exercise and
establishment clauses.
50. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
51. 404 F.2d 1078 (9th Cir. 1969).
52. Supra note 50, at 340.
53. In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan felt that the expansion of the
Seeger test in the prevailing opinion has worked a total elimination of the required
religious content for a conscientious objector exemption and views the issue to be
"whether a statute that defers to the individual's conscience only when his views
emanate from adherence to theistic religious beliefs is within the power of Congress."
Supra note 50 at 356.
He concludes that the statute contravenes the establishment clause of the first
amendment, however, he accepts the prevailing opinion's expanded parallelism test
rather than declare the statute void.
54. Supra note 50, at 341.
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Seeger and subsequent decisions illustrate the expanded interpretation
given to the phrase "religious training and belief" as used in both the selec-
tive service and naturalization statutes. It is evident that a "personal moral
code" may be viewed as religious if it occupies a prominent and motivating
position in the life of the believer. The consequence of this development
is the classification of atheistic beliefs as religious under a parallel-belief
test which qualifies them for the exemption. Weitzman gives consideration
to a deeply held belief which the believer steadfastly refuses to call religious,
alleging as its basis a "biological" and "instinctual" aversion to killing and
belief in the order of existence. Thus, the case presents an opportunity,
not only for consideration of the constitutionality of the relevant legislation,
but also for further interpretation of the Court-pronounced parallelism test.
Judge Lay, in Weitzman, sought to reverse the lower court's decision
and chose not to consider the constitutional questions raised. He found
that an applicant who had demonstrated sincere belief on the basis of con-
science and conviction has exhibited religious belief within the statutory re-
quirements, despite his disclaimer of belief in a Supreme Being.55 He con-
sidered Mrs. Weitzman to be a sincere pacifist and in light of other recent
decisions following the Seeger guidelines, held that her beliefs qualified as
"religious" beliefs. 50
Judge Blackmun, 57 seeking to affirm the district court decision ad-
dressed himself to the constitutional questions raised and concluded that
the statute is constitutional and that the applicant has not met its require-
ments. He regarded the "religious training and belief" requirements as a
basis for conscientious objection, not as an establishment or prohibition on
the free exercise of religion, but rather as a legislative accommodation of
religious freedom.58 Referring to the district court decision in United
States v. Sisson,5 9 Blackmun conceded that while the language may ulti-
55. Supra note 19, at 458.
56. Supra note 19, at 457.
57. Judge Blackmun was subsequently appointed by President Nixon to be an
associate justice of the United States Supreme Court.
58. Blackmun cites as a basis for his point the Selective Draft Law cases,
245 U.S. 366 (1918) in which Mr. Justice Brandeis said: "And we pass without
stating anything but the proposition that an establishment of a religion or an inter-
ference with the free exercise thereof repugnant to the First Amendment resulted
from the exemption clauses of the Act, to which we at the outset referred because
we think its unsoundness is too apparent to require us to do more." Similar rulings
appeared in the other cases of this controversy-Goldman v. United States, 245
U.S. 474 (1918); Kramer v. United States, 245 U.S. 478 (1918); Ruthenberg v.
United States, 245 U.S. 480 (1918); Yanyar v. United States, 246 U.S. 649 (1918);
and Stephens v. United States, 247 U.S. 504 (1918).
59. Supra note 49.
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mately be declared unconstitutional in the draft-criminal law context, he
would hold otherwise in the naturalization context, where the government
has bestowed a privilege. 60
For Judge Heaney, concurring with Judge Lay in reversing the decision
of the lower court, the issue was whether the statute should be interpreted as
permitting all who -sincerely object, out of conscience, to bearing arms to be
excused from the oath, or whether the court should hold that the statute
was unconstitutional. He preferred the former. Placing significance in
the use of the words "merely personal code," Heaney emphasized that the
legislature has been careful not to specifically exclude from the benefits of
the exemption those whose objections stem from conscience. 6' Finding
support for his position in the legislative hearings, 62 Heaney felt that Mrs.
Weitzman had sustained her burden of proving that she was opposed to
bearing arms as a matter of conscience. He therefore concluded that she
should be permitted to take the oath and become a citizen. Thus, possibly
with a view to the limitations of the Seeger parallel-belief test and a reluc-
tance to declare the statute unconstitutional, Heaney took the most
advanced position of the three judges by urging a recognition of beliefs
stemming purely from conscience.
Mrs. Weitzman, therefore, having established the sincerity of her paci-
fism, was allowed to take the naturalization oath as a conscientious objec-
tor. The split in the appellate court, however, detracted from the strength
and significance of the opinion.
While the question of atheistic beliefs was not directly dealt with, pre-
vious decisions have implied that such beliefs may qualify under the par-
allelism test, if they can be shown to: (1) be the product of previous re-
ligious training; (2) function as a religion for the believer; or (3) hold a
position parallel to religious beliefs. While not admitting a belief in a Su-
preme Being or superior force, Mrs. Weitzman did not reject the notion of
an ordered universe. Under previous interpretations of the parallelism
test, her beliefs do appear to qualify. However, Judge Heaney went be-
yond the limitations of the Seeger test in concluding that Congress cannot,
consistent with the first amendment, treat non-religious conscientious ob-
60. Supra note 19, at 454.
61. Supra note 19, at 462.
62. Heaney quotes S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong. 2d Sess., 742, 746 which states:
"The subcommittee realizes and respects the fact that the question of whether or
not a person must bear arms in defense of his country may be one which invades
the province of religion and personal conscience. Thus, it recommended that an
alien not be required to vow to bear arms when he asserted his opposition to partici-
pation in war in any form because of personal religious training and belief.
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jectors differently from those whose beliefs are religiously based. Thus,
with the opinion of Judge Heaney, In re Weitzman advocates the recogni-
tion of conscience as the only justifiable basis for administration of the con-
scientious objector exemption, regardless of whether such beliefs have a re-
ligious or personal basis.
That severe problems have developed in applying the parallelism test in
differentiating between religious beliefs and personal moral codes is appar-
ent from the above discussion. The test does not define "religion" under
the statute and the lower courts have been unable to understand the test
sufficiently to develop standards which are predictable and capable of uni-
form application. For many the test has created more problems than it has
solved. While it has permitted the courts to avoid the constitutional issues,
the test's uncertainties demand greater clarification if they are to have a
meaningful application in the area of conscientious objection. The statute
in both the naturalization and selective service area should be revised by
Congress or interpreted by the courts as permitting all who hold strong and
conscientious beliefs to qualify, with no distinction between religious and
non-religious beliefs. Such an approach complies with the original inten-
tion of the exemption-not to require men to act in violation of their con-
science. While it may be difficult for the judiciary to evaluate the strength
and sincerity of an applicant's beliefs, this task is no greater than that pres-
ently faced under the parallelism test. Any further expansion of this test
would be futile, as any attempt to distinguish between religious beliefs and
personal moral codes is doomed to failure. The conflict between the de-
mands of government and one's convictions has historically been an area
where adjudication is most difficult. However, with the collapse of dis-
tinctions based upon religion in other areas of the law and in view of the
inadequacies and uncertainties of current standards, the formal recognition
of non-religious conscientious exemption is desirable, if not required.
Gerald Golden
1971] 1061CASE NOTES
